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FRANCIS A. ALLEN - AN APPRECIATION 
Sanford H. Kadish* 
Francis Allen and I overlapped as members of the Michigan Law 
faculty in the 1962-63 academic year. It was much too short a col-
leagueship. But Frank hadn't gotten Chicago out of his system at that 
time, and I, a year after his departure, decided to follow the sun. (It 
took Frank a bit longer, apparently.) At all events, that year together 
at Michigan was the start of a friendship which has survived the sepa-
ration of the intervening years. I became and remain a total and en-
thusiastic admirer of Frank Allen as a person and as a scholar, and of 
all that he stands for. To the shameless partisanship I bring to the 
task of penning these comments I offer these two pleas in abatement: 
one, that such is the inevitable fate of those who come to know him, 
and two, what I say here about him and his work has the redeeming 
virtue of being demonstrably true. 
I will not try to say all that deserves to be said about Professor 
Allen's many achievements. I rely on others to speak from firsthand 
experience to such facets of his excellence as his talents as a teacher, 
his contributions as dean of the Michigan Law School during some 
trying years, his success in leading a revision of the Illinois Penal 
Code. I will confine my observations to what I know firsthand - his 
contributions to legal scholarship. 
Frank Allen is a towering figure in criminal law scholarship. The 
bulk and range of his bibliography and the close attention paid his 
work by those who labor in these fields are sure indicators of his power 
and influence. Precisely because of his stature some comment is called 
for on the style of his work and the qualities of mind and heart which 
it reveals; on the nature of his intellectual contributions and how they 
came to have the impact they did. 
Allen is a master of the essay form. He has done some work in the 
classic law review article mode, in chronicling the Supreme Court's 
development of the constitutional law of criminal procedure. 1 But the 
* Morrison Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. - Ed. 
1. Two of his best-known articles in this area deal with Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) 
(The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1 
(1950)), and the case that overruled it, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Federalism and the 
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 1). These and other of Allen's 
articles in the field of criminal procedure are discussed elsewhere in this issue. See Kamisar, 
401 
402 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:401 
bulk of his writing, and indeed his most significant work, is not in that 
style at all. His metier has been the essay. 
In saying this I don't mean to imply anything unkind about the 
law review article. It's a form and it has its uses. There are great 
examples of it and also indifferent ones. That's true of any style of 
writing. All I mean to say is that those features that are typical of 
modem law review articles are not typical of Allen's work. The stan-
dard law review article is long, it seeks to be comprehensive, it is heav-
ily footnoted, it collects all material that bears on the subject, it 
assumes that the reader knows nothing about the subject and explains 
everything, it offers itself as a reference tool as well as (or more than) 
an argument. It is, in a word, a short monograph for the uninitiated. 
Allen's medium, by contrast, is the essay - short, pithy, graceful, epi-
grammatic, speculative commentary. Where one reads the law review 
article as a matter of duty, one turns to an essay for the pleasure of 
reading it, as well as for the wisdom it provides. At least this is true of 
the best examples of the essay form, and Allen's pieces are certainly 
that. 
We owe this output of essays to Allen's great popularity on the 
circuit of invited lectureships. They provided him with a medium per-
fectly suited to his special gifts; indeed in his hands they became a high 
art. When it is observed that a large part of his opus is the product of 
these lectures we have cause to be grateful to the sensible people who 
invited him. 
Allen's essays focused principally on two great subjects - the 
criminal law and the university. The first he addressed from the per-
spective of scholarly observer; the second from that of embattled 
participant. 
His writing in criminal law was pioneering. There was a long tra-
dition of abstention by criminal law scholars from the subjects of pun-
ishing and treating offenders and the functioning of the agencies of 
criminal justice. These subjects had been yielded to the field of crimi-
nology, along with that of the nature and causes of criminal behavior. 
The landmark study of Michael and Adler in 1933, Crime, Law and 
Social Science, in demonstrating the jejune quality of much research in 
these areas, stamped a second-class label on the whole field that 
warned off a generation of criminal law scholars. That left little for 
law professors to do, since writing on the other significant issue of the 
criminal law, the choice and definition of conduct to be made criminal, 
Francis A. Allen: "Confront[ing] the Most Explosive Problems" and "Plumbing All Issues to Their 
Full Depth Without Fear or Prejudice," 85 MICH. L. REV. 406 (1986). 
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had long suffered a tradition of neglect and trivialization. The dol-
drums were broken by two scholars. Herbert Wechsler brought re-
spectability to the substantive criminal law. Frank Allen did the same 
for the issues of the punishment of offenders and the workings of the 
agencies of criminal justice. 
Allen's work in these areas is framed by two books of essays, The 
Borderland of Criminal Justice: Essays in Law and Criminology, pub-
lished in 1964, and The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, constituting 
the Storrs Lectures at Yale in 1979. The first comprises lectures deliv-
ered between 1954 and 1963. The subjects do not seem remarkable 
today - "The Borderland of Criminal Law: Problems of 'Socializing' 
Criminal Justice"; "Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal"; "The 
Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice" - but at the time 
virtually no other legal scholar was writing in these fields. While they 
later emerged as central problems for criminal law scholarship, it was 
Allen who did more than any other person to make this happen. 
The importance of Allen's work was not limited to establishing a 
new agenda for legal research; the ideas he brought to these issues had 
a shaping influence on the thinking of a generation of legal scholars. 
Consider some of the themes of his writing: the pervasive overuse of 
the criminal law; the self-defeating consequences of using the criminal 
law to perform social services, including its tendency to corrupt the 
agencies of criminal justice; the injustices committed by juvenile court 
processes by cloaking punitive responses in the wrappings of child wel-
fare; the neglect of standards of decency and dignity that should apply 
whenever the law brings coercive measures to bear upon the individ-
ual; the preoccupation with reform of the offender, which he labeled 
the "rehabilitative ideal," the questionable assumptions behind it, and 
the inevitable debasement of that ideal that results from imposing it on 
the system of criminal justice. It is remarkable the extent to which 
these ideas became the central themes in criminal law scholarship in 
the years that followed. 
More than that. Those ideas proved also to have had a significant 
influence on law and policy. The reach of the criminal law has been 
limited, at least to some extent; juvenile court processes have been re-
formed by the extension of constitutional and statutory rights to the 
juvenile; most significantly, the rehabilitative ideal has been substan-
tially undermined and even wholly replaced in some jurisdictions by 
the elimination of parole and the use of determinate sentencing with 
an exclusively punitive rationale. This last development is hardly one 
to which Allen would want to claim paternity, since it represents just 
that indiscriminate careening to excess that has so blighted penal pol-
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icy in this country. But it provided him with an opportunity in his 
1979 Storrs lectures to reflect on the development of penal policy over 
the previous two decades, a development in which he was a significant 
participant. Here, as reflective observer, Allen has made a contribu-
tion that rivals his contribution as participant, for I know of no con-
temporary work which considers with more insight and subtlety "the 
relations of law and opinion ... [and] the impact of changes in cul-
tural and political attitudes on penal policy."2 
No account of Allen's work in penology would be adequate with-
out mention of the profound moral vision and large-minded wisdom of 
his contributions. I cannot exhibit this quality better than by letting 
him speak for himself. Commenting on the growing distrust of au-
thority and discretion that drove the demise of the rehabilitative ideal, 
he makes the following plea for a renewal of social purpose which that 
distrust betokened: 
Much in modern attitudes toward authority reflects less a staunch 
individualism standing against the coercions and manipulations of the 
state than a decline of confidence in public purposes .... Sooner or later, 
however, this society must come to terms with social authority. 
Although the notion of there being an identity of social and individual 
interests is a chimera, there are social purposes which, if realized, con-
tribute to a fuller humanity and are indeed the conditions for the 
achievement of human potentialities. Thus protection of persons and 
property from unwarranted aggressions by other members of the com-
munity must be accomplished at some level of adequacy, as must the 
relief of poverty and the care and protection of children, the mentally 
disadvantaged, and other members of the large and varied group of those 
unable to care for themselves. Theories of rights which, if implemented, 
prevent or seriously obstruct the achievement of such social purposes are 
not likely to survive and contain the danger of breeding revulsions that 
strip public support from proper efforts to protect individuals from ty-
rannical governmental interventions. If a theory of rights prevents the 
achievement of social purposes, there is something amiss either in the 
theory of rights or in the conception of public purposes. Penal policy is 
concerned with achieving social purposes in a fashion that nevertheless 
protects the essential humanity of those who, for reasons of social de-
fense, are placed in positions of extreme dependency. But in this era we 
all exist in a state of dependency, and how well we meet the problems of 
penal justice may foretell the degree of our success in dealing with mat-
ters of wider social concern. 3 
Allen's lectures on the university and related issues of the life of 
the mind emerged from his leadership role in legal education, as dean 
of the University of Michigan Law School and President of the Associ-
2. THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 1 (1981). 
3. Id. at 88-89. 
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ation of American Law Schools, during the sixties and seventies.4 
Happily now only a dark memory, this was a period of revolt from the 
Left against the university and the intellectual values for which it 
stood, rivaled in recent times only by the revolt from the Right associ-
ated with Joe McCarthy in the fifties. Allen perceived early that the 
most serious threat was not to law and order on the campuses, "but 
the possible triumph of attitudes and values which, in some instances, 
seek to convert the universities into political pressure groups to 
achieve social objectives that are essentially nonintellectual or even 
anti-intellectual in character," for "[i]f such objectives prevail in their 
more virulent forms, they will incapacitate the universities from per-
forming the functions that are uniquely theirs in the years ahead."5 
Allen's was one of the more eloquent voices of the time reminding all 
of us what those functions were and how far the quality of our society 
would be diminished by their loss. He spoke of the civilizing values a 
university exemplifies - "rationality and the skills of reasoned articu-
lation, "6 disciplined intelligence, the moral dimension of intellectual 
endeavor7 and its indispensability to achieving justice between men, 
humanistic values, tolerance for the thought of others. We needed 
leaders in that era to take on the anti-intellectualism and moral fanati-
cism that possessed so many otherwise well-meaning students (and 
faculty) of those days. In the law school world no one did so with 
greater eloquence and effect. 
Allen's romance with the university is epitomized in a comment he 
recently made to an interviewer: "It has always seemed to me that the 
university life comes about as close to being the good life as one is 
likely to get on this earth."8 Certainly as Frank Allen has been leading 
it, he's unquestionably right. 
4. These essays are collected in LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION (1979). The other sig-
nificant books of lectures that grew out of Allen's engagement with the parlous sixties are CIVIL 
DISOBEDIENCE AND THE LEGAL ORDER (1967) and THE CRIMES OF PoLmcs: POLITICAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974). I pass them without comment only in deference to 
the constraints of brevity appropriate to the occasion. For my views on the latter, see Kadish, 
Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 840 (1975). 
5. LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 24 (1979). 
6. Id. at 26. 
7. Id. at 29. 
8. Miller, Never Leaving Law School, STUDENT LAW., Jan. 1986, at 14, 17. 
